Expected utility functions are limited to second-order (conditional) risk aversion, while non-expected utility functions can exhibit either first-order or second-order (conditional) risk aversion. We extend the concept of orders of conditional risk aversion to orders of conditional dependent risk aversion. We show that first-order conditional dependent risk aversion is consistent with the framework of the expected utility hypothesis. Our theoretical result proposes new insights into economic and financial applications such as the equity premium puzzle, the cost of business cycles, and stock market participation. Our model is compared to the rank-dependent expected utility model.
Introduction
We present a new approach to developing an expected utility model that exhibits first-order risk aversion and explains some economic and finance puzzles. The main contribution of our model is to show that dependent background risk is sufficient to obtain a first-order risk premium distinct from a second-order premium with the standard expected utility framework. Because many economic agents are often exposed to simultaneous dependent risks (for example, an IBM employee who is considering buying IBM stock or a non-permanent employee who owns units of stock index and whose job is subject to business cycles) the sufficient condition we propose is natural for many economic agents.
The concepts of second-order and first-order risk aversion were coined by Segal and Spivak (1990) . For an actuarially fair random variableε, second-order risk aversion means that the risk premium the agent is willing to pay to avoid kε is proportional to k 2 as k → 0. Under firstorder risk aversion, the risk premium is proportional to k. Loomes and Segal (1994) extend this notion to preferences about uninsured events, such as independent additive background risks.
They introduce the concept of orders of conditional risk aversion. Definingỹ as an independent additive risk, the conditional risk premium is the amount of money the decision maker is willing to pay to avoidε in the presence ofỹ. The preference relation satisfies first-order conditional risk aversion if the risk premium the agent is willing to pay to avoid kε is proportional to k as k → 0. It satisfies second-order conditional risk aversion if the risk premium is proportional to k 2 .
First-order risk aversion implies that small risks matter. It is well known from Arrow (1974) and Borch (1974) that differentiable expected utility (EU) is only second order. Because expected utility theory is limited to second-order (conditional) risk aversion, it ignores many real world results. Several non-EU models that can predict first-order risk aversion behavior (i.e. rankdependent EU and loss aversion) are being used in the economic and financial literatures to explain puzzles that EU cannot handle (see, Epstein and Zin 1990; Quiggin 1982; Tversky and Kahneman 1992) .
For example, risk-averse individuals are reluctant to take a small actuarially favorable gamble or to invest in financial markets with a positive risk premium. These two puzzles -coward gambler (Samuelson, 1963) and the stock market participation puzzle (Barberis et al., 2006) have been solved with the property of first-order risk aversion, but outside the expected utility framework. Two other significant puzzles are the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985) , in which asset prices are poorly explained by reasonable values of risk aversion, and the welfare cost of business cycles considered small by an expected utility representative agent who does not consider dependent background risk (Lucas, 1987) .
In this paper, we reinvestigate whether first-order conditional risk aversion appears in the framework of the expected utility hypothesis. The general answer to this question is positive with some weak restrictions: expected utility theory exhibits first-order risk aversion when there is a dependent background risk, but not otherwise. We extend the concepts of orders of conditional risk aversion to orders of conditional dependent risk aversion, for whichε and the background riskỹ are dependent andỹ may enter the agent's utility function arbitrarily. We thus propose a new source of first-order risk aversion over general preferences. Because EU theory is simple, parsimonious, and able to explain a wide set of empirical facts, our use of first-order risk aversion is easy to interpret in many real-world applications, and the assumptions are plausible. It is now well accepted that a labor or income risk that changes over economic cycles can be interpreted as a correlated background risk for a representative agent when choosing optimal portfolio or assets in pension funds.
We propose conditions on the stochastic structure betweenε andỹ that guarantee firstorder conditional dependent risk aversion for expected utility agents with a certain type of risk preference; i.e., with correlation aversion. Eeckhoudt, Rey and Schlesinger (2007) provide an economic interpretation of correlation aversion: a higher level of the background variable mitigates the detrimental effect of a reduction in wealth. It turns out that the concept of expectation dependence proposed by Wright (1987) , which is a stronger measure of dependence than covariance, is a key element of such a stochastic structure.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 explains the concept of expectation dependence. Section 4 discusses the concept of orders of conditional risk aversion and investigates the orders of conditional dependent risk aversion. It also presents two special cases and two examples of the general model. Section 5 applies the results to two economic puzzles. Section 6 offers a direct comparison between expected utility and rank-dependent expected utility for generating first-order risk aversion. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2
We consider an agent whose preference for random wealth,w, and a random outcome,ỹ, can be represented by a bivariate expected utility function. Let u(w, y) be the utility function. We assume that all partial derivatives required for any definition exist. We make the standard assumption that u 1 > 0, where u 1 = ∂u ∂w . Let us assume thatz = kε is the risk faced by a risk-averse agent. Parameter k can be interpreted as the size of the risk. One way to measure an agent's degree of risk aversion for z is to ask him how much he is willing to pay to eliminatez. This value will be referred to as the risk premium π(k) associated with that risk. For an agent with utility function u, Eỹ the expected value of another riskỹ, and non-random initial wealth w, the risk premium π(k) must satisfy the following condition in the absence of a background risk:
(1) Segal and Spivak (1990) give the following definitions of first-and second-order risk aversion:
Definition 2.1 (Segal and Spivak, 1990 
They provide the following results linking properties of the order of expected utility model to its order of risk aversion given the level of wealth w 0 :
(a) If the utility function u is not differentiable at w 0 but has well-defined and distinct left and right derivatives at w 0 , then the agent exhibits first-order risk aversion at w 0 .
(b) If the utility function u is twice differentiable at w 0 with u 11 < 0, then the agent exhibits second-order risk aversion at w 0 . Segal and Spivak (1996) point out that if the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is increasing, then it must be differentiable almost everywhere, and one may convincingly argue that non-differentiability is seldom observed in the expected utility model. Alternatively, like increasing functions, concave functions may still have a countable set of points of nondifferentiability. Loomes and Segal (1994) introduced the order of conditional risk aversion by examining the characteristics of π(k) in the presence of an independent uninsured riskỹ i . For an agent with utility function u and initial wealth w, the conditional risk premium π c (k) must satisfy the following condition:
Definition 2.2 (Loomes and Segal, 1994 
It is obvious that the definitions of first-and second-order conditional risk aversion are more general than the definitions of first-and second-order risk aversion. We can extend the above definitions to the case Eε ̸ = 0. Because u is differentiable, fully differentiating (2) with respect to k yields:
Becauseε andỹ i are independent,
Therefore, not only does π c (k) approach zero as k approaches zero, but also π ′ c (0) = 0. This implies that at the margin, accepting a small risk has no effect on the welfare of economic agents. This is an important property of expected utility theory: in the small, the expected utility maximizers are risk-neutral in the presence of an independent background risk.
Using a Taylor expansion of π c around k = 0, we obtain that 1
This result is the Arrow-Pratt approximation, which states that the conditional risk premium is approximately proportional to the square of the size of the risk.
In conclusion, if the random outcome and the background risk are independent, then secondorder conditional risk aversion relies on the assumption that the utility function is differentiable. Hence, within a framework of independent background risk, utility functions in the von 1 In the statistical literature, the sequence b k is at most of order White, 2000, p. 16 ).
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility class can generically exhibit only second-order conditional risk aversion, and cannot explain the rejection of a small and actuarially favorable gamble or the acceptance of a full insurance contract with actuarially unfair pricing.
Expectation Dependence
We denote by F (ε, y) the joint distribution function of (ε,ỹ). F ε (ε) and F y (y) are the marginal distributions. Wright (1987) introduced the concept of expectation dependence in the economics literature.
Definition 3.1 If
and there is at least some y 0 f or which a strong inequality holds, thenε is positive expectation dependent onỹ. Similarly,ε is negative expectation dependent oñ y if (6) holds with the inequality sign reversed. Wright (1987, p. 113 ) interprets negative expectation dependence as follows: "when we discoverỹ is small, in the precise sense that we are given the truncationỹ ≤ y, our expectation ofε is revised upward." He also provides the following theorem to link expectation dependence and covariance. Hence, "ε is positive (negative) expectation dependent onỹ" does not mean that "ỹ is the causality ofε." Expectation dependence simply means that the two variables are dependent, and the covariance between the two random variables (Cov(ε,ỹ)) is not strong enough to measure this dependence.
One example of distribution with positive expectation dependent random variables is the bivariate normal distribution with positive correlation coefficient. Because positive (negative) expectation dependence is a weaker definition than positive (negative) quadrant dependence (Wright, 1987, p. 114) , bivariate random variables that are positive (negative) quadrant dependent (Lehmann, 1966) are also positive (negative) expectation dependent. Portfolio selection problems with positive quadrant dependent (PQD) variables are explored by Pellerey and Semeraro (2005) and Dachraoui and Dionne (2007) , among others. Pellerey and Semeraro (2005) assert that a large subset of the elliptical distribution class is PQD. (ε, m(ỹ) ).
In the following proposition, we introduce a specific distributional assumption that is frequently used in the macroeconomics literature for representing an idiosyncratic risk.
Proposition 3.3 Supposeỹ = h(ε,ũ), where h(ε, u) is increasing (decreasing) in ε, and (ε,ũ)
are independent random variables, thenε is positive (negative) expectation dependent onỹ.
Supposeỹ is an idiosyncratic risk andε is an aggregate risk. Althoughỹ is dependent oñ ε, Proposition 3.3 shows that the aggregate risk is expectation dependent on the idiosyncratic risk. We use the following two examples to illustrate that Proposition 3.3 corresponds to typical ways of introducing an idiosyncratic risk in macroeconomic and finance literatures. Krebs (2007, p. 667) . Constantinides and Duffie (1996) and De
Example 3.4 DenoteC as aggregate consumption. The labor income (earnings) of worker i is denoted byW i . Labor income is uncertain and defined byW
i = (aI {C≤C * } + bI {C>C * } )gũ i ,aI {C≤C * } + bI {C>C * } is
the cyclical component of labor income risk, and we can interpret this component as describing job displacement risk. b − a is the income loss of a worker who is displaced when the aggregate stateC
≤ C * . Because h(C, u i ) = (aI {C≤C * } + bI {C>C * } )gu i is increasing in C,
Santis (2007). Because h(C, δ i ) = e δ i C is increasing in C, from Proposition 3.3, we know that
C is positive (negative) expectation dependent onW i .
Order of conditional dependent risk aversion

Definition
We now introduce the concept of order of conditional dependent risk aversion. For an agent with utility function u and non-random initial wealth w, the conditional dependent risk premium, π cd (k), must satisfy the following condition:
whereε andỹ are not necessarily independent risks. We propose the following definitions:
Definition 4.1 The agent's attitude towards risk at w is first-order conditional dependent risk
measures how dependence between risks affects the risk premium. Secondorder conditional dependent risk aversion implies that in the presence of a dependent background risk, a small risk has no (significant) effect on risk premium. However, first-order conditional dependent risk aversion implies that in the presence of a dependent background risk, a small risk affects the risk premium significantly. This means that in the presence of a dependent background risk, the risk premium associated with a small risk is mainly explained by O(k), or by the first-degree conditional risk aversion.
Definition 3.1 is useful for deriving a first-order approximation of π cd (k).
Lemma 4.2
Proof See Appendix.
Lemma 4.2 shows the general measure for first-order conditional risk aversion. The first term involves two important concepts: u 12 , the cross-derivative of the utility function, and ED(y), the expectation dependence between the two risks. The sign of u 12 indicates how this first concept acts on utility. Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) provide a context-free interpretation of the sign of u 12 . They show that u 12 < 0 is necessary and sufficient for "correlation aversion,"
meaning that a higher level of the background variable mitigates the detrimental effect of a reduction in wealth. Equation (8) 
|O(k)|; (ii) Ifε is negative expectation dependent onỹ and u 12 > 0, then the agent's attitude towards risk is first-order conditional dependent risk aversion and π
The intuition behind Proposition 4.3 is that in the absence of a dependent background risk, differentiable EU is only second order because the derivative is taken around the certainty line (k = 0, meaning no risk). In small neighborhoods differentiable functions behave like linear functions (in the present context, expected value, hence risk neutrality, as in (4)). But suppose that riskε is added to riskỹ and the two are not independent. For example, suppose that y = (−x, H; x, T ) and kε = (−k, H; k, T ); H and T are the same forỹ and kε and represent two states of nature. From hereon, when we take the derivative of π(k) with respect to k, at k = 0, 2 Dionne and Li (2011) show that the more information we have about the sign of higher cross derivatives of the utility, the weaker the dependence conditions on distribution required to guarantee first-order conditional dependent risk aversion.
we take derivatives of the utility function at two different points: w − x and w + x. Because these derivatives are typically different under risk aversion, the derivative with respect to k will not be zero, but rather a function of the difference between U ′ (w − x) and U ′ (w + x) at k = 0, when the two risks are additive.
Consider a truncated standardized bivariate normal distribution with h 1 <ε < +∞, k 1 < y < +∞, and unconditional correlation coefficient ρ. This truncated standardized bivariate normal distribution is not elliptical. From Ang and Chen (2002, p. 488) , we know that ρ > 0 cannot guarantee positive expectation dependence (for simulations on truncated standardized bivariate normal distribution, we refer to Dionne, Li, and Okou, 2012) . The sign of covariance therefore cannot predict the sign of π cd (k). As Proposition 4.3 shows, the sign of expectation dependence can predict first-order risk aversion.
Two special cases and two examples
We consider two special cases to illustrate Proposition 4.3. U ′ (xy) < 1 andε is positive (negative) expectation dependent on the background riskỹ, then the agent's attitude towards risk is first-order conditional dependent risk aversion and π cd (k) < (>)π c (k).
Consider bivariate log-normal random variables (ε,ỹ) with joint probability distribution
where indexes 1 and 2 are used for log(ε) and log(ỹ) respectively. We know from Lien (1985, pp. 244-245) that
where Ψ(z) is the cumulative distribution function of a standardized normal random variable evaluated at z.
Assume that u(w +x +ỹ) = (Samuelson, 1963) . The assumption that people are cowards gamblers has some clear implications to financial markets (Segal and Spivak, 1990 
where w 0 = w(1 + r f ) is future wealth obtained with the risk-free asset andx =r − r f . The agent's expected utility is (Segal and Spivak, 1990) .
Suppose u 11 ≤ 0. Because V is concave in α, the agent will invest a positive amount in the risky asset if and only if Eu(w 0 + αx,ỹ) > Eu(w 0 ,ỹ) for small α > 0. From part (i) of Proposition
4.5, we know that if the decision maker's attitude towards risk is second-order conditional dependent risk aversion, then the agent will invest a positive amount in the risky asset if it has a positive risk premium (E ( r) > r f ). This replicates Arrow's (1974) famous result. However, part (ii) of Proposition 4.5 tells us that this conclusion fails when the decision maker is first-order conditional dependent risk-averse. In this case, we get the much more plausible result that if the risk premium is positive but sufficiently small, a correlation-averse decision maker will not invest in the risky asset if it is positive expectation dependent on the background risk. This last result is related to the financial market participation puzzle (Berbaris et al., 2006). It is well documented that the expected utility model (without a background risk) cannot explain the rejection of a small and actuarially favorable gamble. EU decision makers with second-order risk aversion will always invest part of their wealth in a risky asset with a positive risk premium, while first-order risk averse investors may not invest in this risky asset
Part (ii) of Proposition 4.5 shows that this last result is compatible with an EU decision maker in the presence of a dependent background risk.
In this section, we illustrate the applicability of our results to two problems (puzzles) analyzed in the literature. In particular, we demonstrate the practical relevance of the distinction between first-and second-order risk aversion. In these applications, the background risk is interpreted as an idiosyncratic risk. For example, in a permanent income shock macroeconomic environment, full insurance of background risk is not possible (see, for example, Constantinides and Duffie, 1996) . Therefore, at equilibrium there is no trading between consumers to eliminate the idiosyncratic risk. Consumption shocks translate into idiosyncratic income shocks and background risk remains significant.
The equity premium puzzle
The equity premium puzzle illustrates that second-order risk aversion is not sufficient to explain asset prices. Epstein and Zin (1990) solve the puzzle with rank-dependent expected utility, which exhibits first-order risk aversion. Another explanation involves incomplete market models with idiosyncratic risk. Constantinides and Duffie (1996) show how the introduction of heterogeneity in the form of uninsurable, persistent and heteroskedastic labor income shocks may resolve the puzzle in theory. Krueger and Lustig (2010) present five conditions to affirm that market incompleteness does not increase the risk premium. One of these conditions is the independence between idiosyncratic risk and aggregate shocks. In this subsection, we show how dependent risks increase the risk premium in the framework of expected utility.
We concentrate our analysis on the independence assumption by considering the standard representative agent model with two dependent risks. We use the static version of Weil's (1992) model proposed by Gollier and Schlesinger (2002) to illustrate our main result. Our model with dependent risks is a particular case of the intertemporal setting of Krueger and Lustig (2010) , but adequately illustrates the effect of a dependent idiosyncratic risk on asset price.
Note that our measure of risk dependence is very general and that our result holds for (almost) all concave expected utility functions, including constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences.
We consider a static Lucas (1978) tree economy which consists of individuals, all of whom may be portrayed, ex ante, by a representative agent. The economy is competitive in that individuals maximize expected utility with prices taken as given. Initial wealth consists of one unit of the risky asset plus an allocation of a risk-free asset. We assume that the risk-free rate is zero. We denote w as the value of wealth that is initially invested in the risk-free asset and definex as the final payoff of the risky asset. Agents' preferences can be represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u. Agents can adjust their portfolio by buying and selling the two assets, and consume all their wealth at the end of the period. Let P represent the price of the risky asset and β denote the demand for additional units ofx. In the absence of a background risk, we assume that the agent faces the following optimization program:
Gollier and Schlesinger (2002) show that the equilibrium asset price with an excess demand of zero (β * = 0) is equal to
One way to explain the equity premium puzzle in this theoretical framework is to recognize that there are other sources of risk on final wealth than the riskiness of asset returns. To capture the effects of these types of risks, we introduce a background riskỹ, which can not be fully insured.
This yields the following optimization program:
and modified equilibrium asset price:
We want to compare P * * with P * . Because E (x) is the same in both cases and the equity premium is E (x) − P (see Gollier and Schlesinger, 2002, p. 756) , this comparison is identical to comparing the equity premiums.
, andx andỹ are independent.ỹ is multiplicative, as in Krueger and Lustig (2010) and Constantinides and Duffie (1996) . Then u 1 = (w + x) −γ y 1−γ and
while
We verify that P * = P * * . We obtain the irrelevance result for the CRRA utility function and independent multiplicative risks. This conclusion meets Krueger and Lustig (2010, pp. 9-10) when all other conditions are verified. 
Again P * = P * * . We obtain the irrelevance result of Weil (1992) for the CARA utility function and independent additive risks. In both cases, the risk premium is not affected by the introduction of an independent background risk.
We want to find the condition under which idiosyncratic risk is a potential solution to the equity premium puzzle. We suppose thatx =x + kε with Eε = 0 to maintain the assumption of a small risk. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 5.1
For small risk, we have the following conclusions. (i) Ifε andỹ are independent, then ED(y) = 0 for all y, and P * * − P * = O(k 2 ). Again, this difference is very small and even nil for many utility functions used in the financial literature, as shown above; (ii) Ifε is positive expectation dependent onỹ and u 12 < 0, then P * * − P * = −|O(k)|; and (iii) Ifε is negative expectation dependent onỹ and u 12 < 0, then
From (8), we can rewrite P * * − P * as
where (8), and
is a positive constant if k is small enough. This is true because when k is small, the sign of u 112 does not matter. Therefore, (22) indicates that when the risk is small, the equity premium is determined by the order of conditional dependent risk aversion (π cd (k)). Our result shows that independent background risk can only generate a second-order effect, whereas an expectation dependent background risk can generate a first-order effect, and hence offers a better understanding of the effect of incomplete markets on asset prices
Another way to interpret our result is the following. Suppose that
) ,
are defined in Examples 3.4 and 3.5.W i is the labor income of agent i andx is the outcome of the risky asset. Thenx can also be positive expectation dependent onW i when aggregate per capita consumptionC is positive expectation dependent onW i . 3 Proposition 5.1 states that the asset price in an economy with a dependent idiosyncratic labor income riskW i should be significantly lower than the asset price in an economy with an independent idiosyncratic labor income risk.
In particular, (22) states that with a positive π cd , we get a negative price difference (P * * − P * ) , which means a higher risk premium in the economy with a dependent (and persistent) idiosyncratic labor income risk that cannot be hedged. We can explain this result as follows: becausex andW i are positive expectation dependent, and the risk averse agent cannot hedge the simultaneous downside (upside) evolution of (x,W i ), then the agent requires a higher risk premium for holdingx withW i than for holdingx with EW i . In Constantinides and Duffie's (1996) model, the permanent idiosyncratic shocks affect the standard deviation of consumption growth and possibly solve the equity premium puzzle if econometricians can find sufficiently large idiosyncratic risks in the data. Here, the idiosyncratic shock affects the dependence between asset payoff and labor income and the challenge for the econometricians is to find variations in dependences
The welfare cost of business cycles
We now consider how eliminating all consumption variability affects welfare. Consider a representative consumer, endowed with the stochastic per capita consumption streamc =c + kε.
Preferences over such consumption are assumed to be
whereỹ is a background risk.
A risk-averse consumer would prefer a deterministic consumption to a risky one with the same mean under certain conditions. As in Lucas (1987) , we quantify the utility difference between risk with compensation and certainty by multiplying the risky consumption by the constant factor 1 + λ. We choose a λ such that the household is indifferent between the deterministic consumption and the compensated risky one. In other words, λ * solves Lucas (1987; 2003) defines the compensation parameter λ * as the welfare gain (or welfare loss) from eliminating consumption risk. Whenỹ is an insurable risk (ỹ ≡ Eỹ), Lucas (1987; 2003) argues that the welfare costs of business cycles are likely to be very small, and that the potential gains from counter-cyclical stabilization policy are negligible. Therefore governments should look for ways to attain higher growth rates rather than for economic policies to reduce fluctuation in consumption. However, this conclusion conflicts with the actual practice of short-term economic policies in many countries. Epstein-Zin recursive utility and first-order risk aversion variations model yields bigger numbers (Dolmas, 1998; Epaulard and Pommeret, 2003) . As we will see, incomplete market models can also offer higher numbers. Our result shows that dependent background risk appears to be a key factor.
We now apply our results to this issue. Because for ∀λ, we have
c+kEε−π cd (k) and we obtain that: Proposition 5.2 states that when the risk associated with consumption is small, we obtain the following: (i) If the consumption risk and the background risk are independent, then the welfare costs of business cycles is very small, and therefore the potential gains from counter-cyclical stabilization policy are negligible; (ii) If consumption risk is positive expectation dependent on the background risk, then the welfare costs of business cycles can be large, and the potential gains from a counter-cyclical stabilization policy may be significant.
To obtain a more intuitive interpretation of our result, we can define u(c, y) = U (c i ) = U (c+ y i ), wherec =C is per capita consumption andỹ i =W i is, in this case, an idiosyncratic shock on consumption that cannot be diversified (De Santis, 2007) . The dependence betweenC and W i can be defined as in Examples 3.4 and 3.5.C is then positive expectation dependent onW i .
Proposition 5.2 shows that in the presence of a permanent idiosyncratic shock on consumption, the potential gains from a counter-cyclical stabilization policy will be more significant than in a situation with a less permanent shock that can be insurable. De Santis (2007) obtained a similar result with a different model. Here the main effect is first-order instead of second-order.
6 Link with rank-dependent expected utility theory Because Epstein and Zin (1990) extended rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) to intertemporal utility, RDEU has become an important source of first-order risk aversion in the macroeconomics literature. In this section, we show the connection between our results and RDEU for generating first-order risk aversion.
In RDEU (Quiggin 1982; Segal 1990) , there is a strictly increasing and continuous function
Because
where V (x, y) = U (x)y andỹ = g ′ (F x (x)), we can view the rank ordering of outcomes as a background riskỹ in the framework of expected utility. The concavity (convexity) of g is a necessary and sufficient condition for risk aversion (risk loving) in RDEU model, because the probabilities of the worst (best) consequences are over-weighted compared to their untransformed probabilities (Chew et al., 1987; Yaari, 1987) .
every increasing function m,x is negative (positive) expectation dependent onỹ if g is concave (convex). We can say that when the agent is risk-averse (risk-loving) in the RDEU model,ỹ is a negative (positive) expectation dependent background risk.
We define the risk premium for RDEU, π RDEU (k), as
From Proposition 4.3 and the fact that V 12 ≥ 0, we obtain π 
Conclusion
This paper shows that differentiable expected utility can be compatible with first-order risk behavior if there exists a risk that can be eliminated and a background risk that cannot be eliminated (such as uncertain labor income), but these two risks are dependent. We have presented a set of applications and examples to illustrate that the practical relevance of the distinction between first-and second-order risk aversion is significant. We offer a better understanding of some economic and finance real world situations, and how they relate to the non-standard preference models.
We show how the presence of a dependent background risk modifies several well-known results in the literature and may help to address different puzzles in economics and finance.
Our analysis derives the conditions under which a risk-averse individual decides not to invest in financial markets (or not to participate in a lottery) even when the risk premium is positive. This will happen, for a correlation-averse individual, when the positive risk premium on the stock market (or the lottery) is sufficiently low and is positive expectation dependent on a background
risk.
We also demonstrate that the presence of a dependent background risk introduces a firstorder conditional risk premium in the price of a security while an independent background risk can generate only a second-order risk premium. This implies that econometricians must find the appropriate data to estimate this additional conditional risk premium that is probably implicitly included in the overestimated constant relative risk aversion measure observed in the equity premium puzzle literature. We also obtain that in the presence of a background risk, the welfare cost of business cycles may be significant for a risk-averse representative agent facing a dependent background risk, which can justify more active counter-cyclical stabilization policies that would benefit, for example, employees whose pension benefits are provided by firms whose main activity is correlated with business cycles.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3.3
Suppose h(ε, u) is increasing in ε. By law of total covariance 4 , we have
= Cov (ε, γ(h(ε,ũ) ) Cov(ε, γ(h(ε,ũ) Cov(ε, γ(h(ε,ũ) |ũ)] + Cov (Eε, E(γ(h(ε,ũ) Cov(ε, γ(h(ε,ũ) |ũ)] ≥ 0 for every increasing γ. Therefore,ε is positive expectation dependent onỹ.
Suppose h(ε, u) is decreasing in ε. By a similar approach, we can show thatε is negative expectation dependent onỹ.
Appendix: Proof of Lemma 4.2
From the definition of π cd (k), we know that
Differentiating with respect to k yields 
Note that 
Because from Lemma 1 in Tesfatsion (1976 
hence, by straightforward manipulations, we find Q.E.D.
11 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 5.1
Using a Taylor expansion of π around k = 0, we obtain that u 1 (w +x + kε, Eỹ)
= u 1 (w +x, Eỹ) +εu 11 (w +x, Eỹ)k + O(k 2 ), (x + kε)u 1 (w +x + kε, Eỹ) 
= u 1 (w +x,ỹ) +εu 11 (w +x,ỹ)k + O(k 2 ) and (x + kε)u 1 (w +x + kε,ỹ)
=xu 1 (w +x,ỹ) + [εu 1 (w +x,ỹ) + (x + kε)εu 11 (w +x,ỹ)]k + O(k 2 ) =xu 1 (w +x,ỹ) +εu 1 (w +x,ỹ)k +xεu 11 (w +x,ỹ)k +ε 2 u 11 (w +x,ỹ)k
=xu 1 (w +x,ỹ) +εu 1 (w +x,ỹ)k +xεu 11 (w +x,ỹ)k + O(k 2 ).
From (41), we have
Eu 1 (w +x + kε, Eỹ) = u 1 (w +x, Eỹ)
From (42), we have E(x + kε)u 1 (w +x + kε, Eỹ) =xu 1 (w +x, Eỹ)
From ( Q.E.D.
